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COMMENTS
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO REGULATING MONEY POLITICS IN
TAIWAN: LEARNING FROM THE MISTAKES OF OTHERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Well-publicized campaign finance scandals in Taiwan demon-
strate the need for campaign finance laws that can stop the sale of
political influence. Conversely, opponents of campaign finance re-
form contend that campaign finance laws are ineffective. Similar
scandals in the United States prompted significant changes in
campaign finance laws. The fallout from Watergate1 allowed the
passage of the Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of
1974.2 Watergate may have also prompted Canada to adopt the
Election Expenses Act of 1974.3 In the United States, a patchwork
of campaign finance regulations prohibits the quid pro quo sale of
political influence, but these regulations do not guarantee egalitar-
ian elections.4 Similarly, Canadian campaign finance regulations
designed to equalize candidate funds also fall short of their in-
tended objectives.
1. "In a series of Senate hearings, trials, and news stories, the public learned what
Washington politicians had known for decades: campaign-spending laws weren't being
enforced, huge sums of money were being raised and spent in secret, and much of it was
coming from illegal sources, including business corporations." BROOKS JACKSON,
HONEST GRAFr: BIG MONEY AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 72 (2d ed.
1990).
2. See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS &
POLITICAL REFORM 32-35 (4th ed. 1992) (explaining how the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 was amended to establish the Federal Election Commission and limit contri-
butions and spending). The amended Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 is now
codified in 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq.
3. See J. PATRICK BOYER, MONEY AND MESSAGE: THE LAW GOVERNING
ELECTION FINANCING, ADVERTISING, BROADCASTING AND CAMPAIGNING IN CANADA
57-58 (1983) (discussing the ramifications of Watergate and Nixon's $70 million campaign
expenses).
4. "The American system is rooted in the assumption of political equality: 'one per-
son, one vote.' But money, which candidates need to harvest votes, is not distributed
equally." ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 3 (describing the "substantial inequities of politi-
cal financing").
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Taiwan's campaign finance laws are also in need of reform.
Historically, Taiwan's strict campaign finance laws hampered the
political expression of minority political parties such as the Demo-
cratic Progressive Party (DPP).5 Taiwan's parliament, the Legis-
lative Yuan, expanded political freedoms by eliminating many
speech restrictive provisions in the campaign finance laws. Unfor-
tunately, some of these changes created loopholes that may result
in corruption. The Legislative Yuan should first close potential
loopholes in the campaign finance laws and then consider further
revisions to promote egalitarian politics.
This Comment compares campaign finance reform in the
United States and Canada to suggest a course for revising Taiwan's
campaign finance laws. Part II explains the relevance of campaign
funding and highlights the danger to democratic legitimacy posed
by high election expenditures. Part III provides a background of
Taiwan's campaign finance laws. Part IV compares campaign fi-
nance laws in Canada, the United States and Taiwan to identify
areas in need of reform. Part V recommends specific changes in
Taiwan's campaign finance laws.
II. RELEVANCE OF CAMPAIGN FUNDING
To run a successful political campaign, candidates need suffi-
cient financing. Although money alone never guarantees victory
in an election, lack of campaign financing usually guarantees de-
feat.6 For example, in the 1994 elections for the U.S. House of
Representatives, under-funded challengers received fewer votes
than well-funded candidates.7 These elections demonstrated that
5. See John F. Copper, Taiwan's Recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic Prom-
ise, in 101 OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 3, 70
(1990) [hereinafter Copper, Democratic Promise].
6. See LARRY MAKINSON & JOSHUA GOLDSTEIN, OPEN SECRETS: THE EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF CONGRESSIONAL MONEY & POLITICS 5 (Larry Makinson & Joshua
Goldstein eds., 2d ed. 1996); see also CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., DOLLAR
POLITICS 14-15 (Robert A. Diamond ed., 1971) (naming the heaviest spending, yet de-
feated candidates in the 1970 United States Senate elections).
7. Challenger's Percentage of Vote Based on Spending
Spending by Challengers in United States Percentage of popular vote
House of Representatives 1994 Election
$0 or unreported 11.0%
$1-99,999 30.6%
$100,000-249,999 38.0%
$250,000-499,999 43.1%
$500,000 and over 47.5%
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challengers needed at least $500,000 for an even chance of vic-
tory.8 Challengers raising less than that amount could expect de-
feat.9 Although one could argue that under-funded candidates
would not have been successful regardless of the amount of cam-
paign funds raised, the data indicates that successful challengers
raised large sums of campaign funds.
Increased use of political advertising has raised the costs of
elections. Although there are some electoral differences between
the United States, Canada and Taiwan, the increased reliance on
institutionalized mass media raised election costs in all three coun-
tries. In the United States, "[m]oney has always been a critically
important factor in campaigns, but the shift to expensive technol-
ogy has made it the dominant factor."'10 Even in Taiwan, where
political advertisements are banned on television and radio,11 mass
media has increased elections costs. 12
Since Taiwan's 1989 elections, high campaign expenses have
been especially prevalent. 13 In 1989, illegal campaign expenses
such as vote buying, treating, 14 and lavish parties contributed to
high election costs. 15 By the 1995 Legislative Yuan elections, vote
See MAKINSON, supra note 6.
8. Correlation Between Amount Spent by Challe ger and Odds of Winning
Spending by Challengers in United States Approximate Odds Of
House of Representatives 1994 Election Winning
under $100,000 0
$100,000-$249,999 18:1
$250,000-$499,999 6:1
over $500,000 1:1
See id.
9. See id
10. DAN CLAWSON ET AL., MONEY TALKS: CORPORATE PACs AND POLITICAL
INFLUENCE 7 (1992) (citing EDSALL, THE CHANGING SHAPE OF POWER: A REA-
LIGNMENT IN PUBLIC POLICY) [hereinafter CORPORATE PACS].
11. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 50(2) (1994) (Taiwan).
12. See Vincent I. Hsieh, New Channels: Regulation of Taiwan's Cable Television In-
dustry, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 23, 1997, at 7 (discussing the need for foreign investment to
feed the growth of the cable industry).
13. See Copper, Democratic Promise, supra note 5, at 70.
14. See CANADA ELECTIONS ACT §§ 66-67 (1970) (Can.) (describing "treating" as
treating voters to food and liquor to promote candidates, but excluding "light refresh-
ments").
15. "Observers [of the election] noted that vote buying and illegal campaign spending
were the result of Taiwan's economic boom combined with the now greater importance of
elected officials in influencing economic decisions. Most regarded the growth of 'money
politics' as unfortunate but also inevitable." Copper, Democratic Promise, supra note 5, at
71; see also BOYER, supra note 3, at 554 (describing "the ruinous effect such generosity..
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buying had become less prevalent, 16 yet "[p]oliticians did indeed
spend a lot of money campaigning, more per seat than in many
western countries.'
17
High campaign expenses allow the opportunity for major con-
tributors to influence politicians. Large donors such as political
action committees 18 tend to expect access, if not favors, in ex-
change for their contributions. Former Senator Bob Dole ex-
plained that, "[w]hen the Political Action Committees give money,
they expect something in return other than good government."' 19
In the United States, most contributors cannot overtly buy a legis-
lative member's vote on a bill. They do, however, use their access
to request legislative assistance for their clients.20
III. BACKGROUND OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS
Campaign finance regulations primarily prevent corruption.
Limiting contributions can prevent an individual from donating
large sums of money in an attempt to bribe a candidate. Spending
limits and public subsidies may also prevent corruption by decreas-
ing a candidate's need for contributions. Campaign finance regu-
lations can also equalize wealth through two strategies: limits on
candidate and political party spending that reduces the advantage
of larger campaign funds; and public subsidies that mitigate the
disadvantage of smaller campaign funds.
• could have on a candidate's election funds").
16. See John F. Copper, Taiwan's 1995 Legislative Yuan Election, in 132 OCCA-
SIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 1, 36-37 (1996)
[hereinafter Copper, 1995 Election]; see also TERENCE H. QUALTER, THE ELECTION
PROCESS IN CANADA 153 (Paul W. Fox ed., 1970) (explaining that vote buying in Canada
declined because the number of voters was "simply too large to influence through indi-
vidual bribes and threats").
17. Copper, 1995 Election, supra note 16, at 37.
18. "Political action committees [PACs] were born in the 1940s out of a perceived
political necessity. When labor unions were prohibited from spending union treasury
funds to contribute to federal candidates, they invented the idea of pooling donations
from their members and presenting that money to candidates instead." MAKINSON &
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 22 (describing how contribution limits created labor union,
business and ideological PACs).
19. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 244-249 (describing Senator Bob Dole's support of a
campaign finance bill); see also Skip Kaltenheuser, Contributions to Congressmembers
Buy Their Influence, in POLITICIANS AND ETHICS 81, 82 (David Bender et al. eds., 1996)
(phrasing Dole's comment slightly different).
20. See CORPORATE PACS, supra note 10, at 91.
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A. Campaign Finance Laws in the United States and Canada
Most countries regulate election contributions. The United
States regulates campaign finance under the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)21 and the Federal Election Act
Amendments of 1974.22 These laws prevent corruption by limiting
the size of large contributions. 23 The FECA also limits campaign
expenses by setting maximum expenditures. 24
In Canada, the Election Expenses Act of 197425 governs cam-
paign finance. The three goals of the Election Expenses Act of
1974 were: (1) to equalize money available to candidates; (2) to
encourage a more open administration of election finances
through disclosure of expenses and contributions; and (3) to en-
courage public participation in the political process through tax
credits for contributions.26 The Election Expenses Act of 1974
sought to achieve these goals through expenditure limits, disclo-
sure requirements, and public financing of political parties and
candidates. 27
B. Campaign Finance Laws in Taiwan
In Taiwan, the Public Officials Election and Recall Law
(POERL)28 governs elections of all public officials except the
President.29 Enacted only a few years after U.S. and Canadian
21. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225 (1972).
22. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263 (1974).
23. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225 (1972); Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
24. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 203 (1972)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 608 to limit contributions and expenditures). The Supreme Court
later held the FECA expenditure limits unconstitutional, but upheld contribution limits in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
25. Cited in Canada as S.C. 1973-74, c. 51, as amended by S.C. 1977-78, c. 8.
26. See BOYER, supra note 3, at 58.
27. See id.
28. PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW (1994) (Taiwan) (containing
Taiwan's campaign finance regulations) (promulgated by presidential decree (69) t'ai
t'ung (1) yi No. 2660 on May 14, 1980).
29. PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 2 (1994) (Taiwan)
(defining public officials as members of the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly, or
local public officials). Presently, Taiwan's federal legislative power is split between the
National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, though the DPP has suggested that Taiwan
adopt a unicameral congress with three co-equal branches similar to the United States.
For an official DPP statement on constitutional reform, see DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE
PARTY, GIVE TAIWAN A CHANCE 35 (Maysing H. Yang ed., 1996) [hereinafter GIVE
1998] 539
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campaign finance laws, Taiwan's election laws were introduced in
a different political atmosphere.
Money politics played a fundamental role in Taiwan's political
history. When the Kuomingtang (KMT)30 arrived in Taiwan in
1945,31 they imposed martial law leaving themselves the only le-
gally recognized political party.32 The KMT confiscated property
from the Japanese colonial government to create state run enter-
prises. 33 To gain support of the Taiwanese elite and maintain con-
trol of the central government, the KMT distributed these re-
sources to factional supporters. 34 Thus, the KMT maintained
control through martial law and through selling favors to local fac-
tions in exchange for political support.
The KMT maintained elections35 and allowed non-KMT
candidates to run against their candidates.36 Although KMT can-
didates had the advantage of drawing funds from state run enter-
prises, non-KMT candidates sometimes won.37 After four decades
TAIWAN A CHANCE].
30. Also known as the Nationalist Party, the Kuomingtang lost control of China to
the Communists in the civil war. See DAVID E. KAPLAN, FIRES OF THE DRAGON 19-65
(1992) (describing the KMT's defeat at the hands of the Peoples Liberation Army).
31. Under the command of Chiang Kai-shek, KMT troops seized control of Taiwan
by killing about 28,000 civilians. See KAPLAN, supra note 30, at 19-65 (describing the
KMT history beginning in China to their arrival in Taiwan).
32. The KMT imposed martial law on May 20, 1949, suspending constitutional rights
such as street demonstrations and formation of political parties. See Lu Ya-li, Political
Developments in the Republic of China, in DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST
ASIA 35, 36-37 (Thomas W. Robinson ed., 1991). Street protests and organizing political
parties were considered crimes. One famous trial in 1960 involved Lei Chen, the chief
editor of Free China Magazine, who was sentenced to ten years in prison for attempting
to organize an opposition party to the KMT. See Ting Tin-yu, Sociocultural Developments
in the Republic of China, in DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA 75, 82
(Thomas W. Robinson ed., 1991).
33. See GIVE TAIWAN A CHANCE, supra note 29, at 49 (describing the foundation of
money and factional politics in Taiwan); see also John F. Copper & George P. Chen, Tai-
wan's Elections: Political Development and Democratization in the Republic of China, in
64 OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 1, 41-42 (1984)
(commenting that the KMT also appropriated residential property during a housing
shortage).
34. See GIVE TAIWAN A CHANCE, supra note 29, at 49 (explaining that the KMT
successfully became "a distribution center of interests").
35. See Copper & Chen, supra note 33, at 42 (commenting that, in 1983, the KMT
maintained meaningful local elections, but left national elections a hypocritical facade of
democracy).
36. See Ralph N. Clough, The Enduring Influence of the ROC on Taiwan Today, 148
CHINA Q. 1054, 1059 (1996).
37. See id. at 1059.
540
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of martial law, the KMT initiated political reforms.38 In 1986, the
KMT experimented with limited elections and later allowed politi-
cal opposition. 39 By 1989, the more liberal Democratic Progres-
sive Party (DPP) emerged as the KMT's main political competi-
tor.40 The DPP steadily gained influence after 1986, despite the
restrictive election laws.41 In 1993, a right wing faction of the
KMT broke away to form the New Party.42 By 1995, the KMT
maintained only a narrow majority in the Legislative Yuan.43
38. See Lu Ya-li, supra note 32, at 35 (stating "In 1986, the leadership of the Republic
of China (ROC) on Taiwan decided to launch political reforms aimed at transforming the
island's authoritarian system into a constitutional democracy.").
39. The 1986 election was referred to as a "democratic holiday" since it was primarily
a practice exercise in democratic elections. See Yangsun Chou & Andrew J. Nathan,
Democratizing Transition in Taiwan, in 80 OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN
CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 2, 17 (1987) (citing Elections in Taiwan, December 6, 1986:
Rules of the Game for the "Democratic Holiday," ASIA WATCH, Nov. 1986).
40. See Copper, Democratic Promise, supra note 5, at 7-11 (describing the founding of
the DPP in 1986 and their unexpected victory in the 1989 elections); see also Hung-mao
Tien & Yun-han Chu, Building Democracy in Taiwan, 148 China Q. 1141, 1154-55 (1996).
41. "The [1986 election] results must be interpreted in light of the structure of the
Taiwan political system, which limits the campaign to two weeks and restricts publicity,
expenditures, and access to the mass media, and in which there normally is considerable
vote buying and other irregularities." Chou & Nathan, supra note 39, at 17 (citing Elec-
tions in Taiwan, December 6, 1986: Rules of the Game for the 'Democratic Holiday,' ASIA
WATCH, November 1986) (discussing the growth of the DPP despite restrictive election
laws, "Despite these disadvantages, the DPP got 18.90% of the vote in the National As-
sembly election... and 22.17% in the Legislative Yuan election."); see also MARTIN L.
LASATER, A STEP TOWARD DEMOCRACY: THE DECEMBER 1989 ELECTIONS IN
TAIWAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA 89 (1990) (explaining how election restrictions on cam-
paigning, political organization, and freedom of expression help maintain the dominant
party system commonly found in Southeast Asia).
42 See Tien & Chu, supra note 40, at 1151.
43. Distribution of Popular Votes and Seats in Recent Elections for Representative
Bodies
KMT DPP New Independent
Party
1992 Legislative Yuan Election
Popular Vote 52.51% 30.79% N/A 16.70%
Seats 101 51 N/A 9
Percentage of seats 62.7% 31.7% N/A 5.6%
1995 Legislative Yuan Election
Popular Vote 46.06% 33.17% 12.95% 7.82%
Seats 85 54 21 4
Percentage of seats 51.8% 32.9% 12.8% 2.4%
See id. at 1158; see also Clough, supra note 36, at 1059 (1996) (remarking that the KMT
almost failed to elect their Legislative Yuan speaker by one vote on Feb. 1, 1996).
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The March 1996 elections ended the democratic transition
period.44 For the first time the parliament was entirely elected by
the people. 45 Taiwan's inclusive political climate allowed formerly
exiled overseas Taiwanese to return as candidates.46 By 1996, the
former one-party authoritarian regime had yielded to coalition
politics.
47
The KMT drafted the original POERL in 1980, when Taiwan
was under martial law.48 Most of the original campaign finance
provisions of the POERL are remnants of that era.49 To maintain
tight control over the elections, the 1986 POERL included contri-
bution limits, expenditure limits, speech restrictions and reporting
requirements. With an established democratic system, the Legis-
lative Yuan removed many of the most speech restrictive provi-
sions. Unfortunately, the revised laws contain potential loopholes
that may allow corruption. To safeguard past democratic gains,
the Legislative Yuan should revise the campaign finance laws to
prevent corruption.50 The Legislative Yuan could also use cam-
paign finance laws to further egalitarian politics.
IV. AREAS FOR POTENTIAL REFORM
A. Contribution Limits
Contribution limits primarily deter exchanges of contributions
for a candidate's future favors because contributors may seek to
influence a candidate with campaign contributions. These cam-
paign contributions can be made in many ways, including, for ex-
ample, free trips on luxurious corporate jets. 51 On the other hand,
44. See Tien & Chu, supra note 40, at 1141; see also Taiwan President Views Future of
Chinese World, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 21, 1997, at 19 (describing Lee Teng-hui
as Taiwan's "first democratically elected president").
45. See Tien & Chu, supra note 40, at 1141.
46. See id. at 1154.
47. See id. at 1163-64.
48. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW (1983) (Taiwan), translated
in Copper & Chen, supra note 33, at 1, 128-149 (describing the election law as "Effective
during the Period of Mobilization for Suppressing Communist Rebellion").
49. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 45(1) (1983) (Taiwan);
cf. PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 45(1) (1994) (Taiwan).
50. See GIVE TAIWAN A CHANCE, supra note 29, at 48 (warning that "unless thor-
ough reform is undertaken, the fruits of democratization will be eroded away by money
politics and triads").
51. One PAC officer explained that their company refused to use the company jet to
fly members of Congress because of the corrupting influence it might have. "You may or
[Vol. 20:535542
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some lobbyists complain that incumbents demand campaign con-
tributions for their time and attention. 5
2
Contribution limits can reduce misbehavior on both sides.
Capping the amount of large donations can also force candidates
to seek campaign contributions from a larger number of donors.
This would obligate candidates to a broader constituency rather
than to a few special interest groups.
Canada and the United States employ two divergent ap-
proaches towards contribution limits. Canadian federal law does
not limit the size 53 or source of contributions.54 It only requires
candidates to report the amount of the contribution, and the iden-
tity and class of a contributor donating over Can$100.55 Canadian
political candidates are free to solicit money from foreign and do-
mestic sources, including individuals, trade unions, corporations
and other organizations. 56 Unlike the United States, Canada relies
primarily on disclosure to prevent corruption.
The United States perceives that large campaign contributions
can foster corruption. To address this concern, the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)57 limits the amount of contri-
butions to candidates, party committees and political action com-
mittees.58 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that
may not be able to imagine the pressure that is placed on people flying in corporate air-
planes. The temptation is tremendous. Get a member in the air for two hours-feed him,
drinks, take him someplace .... " CORPORATE PACS, supra note 10, at 78.
52. "One lobbyist told the Wall Street Journal that for Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-
N.Y.), 'Nothing is enough. It's continuous pressure. If you don't contribute, they don't
return your calls."' CORPORATE PACs, supra note 10, at 60. One PAC officer contrib-
uted to Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex. and chair of the Senate Finance Committee) after being
told "point blank that 'you don't contribute to us; why should we even help you?' Id
53. See BOYER, supra note 3, at 58 (stating that "federal election finance laws today
provide no limit on the amount that a contributor may give to a party or candidate").
54. See Khayyam Zev Paltiel, Canadian Election Expense Legislation, 1963-85: A
Critical Appraisal Or Was The Effort Worth It?, in COMPARATIVE POLITICAL FINANCE
IN THE 1980s 51, 66 (Herbert E. Alexander ed., 1990).
55. See id
56. See id.
57. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225 (1972).
58. Federal Contribution Limits
To a can- To a na- To any Total
didate or tional party other po- per cal-
candidate committee litical endar
committee per calen- committee year
per elec- dar year per calen-
tion dar year**
Individual may give: $1000 $20,000 $5000 $25,000
54319981
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contributions limits were constitutional.59 Equating campaign con-
tributions with political speech, the Court reasoned that limits on
political speech are constitutionally permissible only when they (1)
serve a sufficiently important state interest and (2) are closely
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational free-
doms.60 Furthermore, the Court held that the $1000 per candidate
limit provided by the FECA was necessary to prevent corruption
or apparent corruption.61
The state interest in Buckley only justifies restricting cam-
paign contributions which are large enough to potentially corrupt
politicians.62 In Carver v. Nixon,63 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the constitutionality of a state statute64 which
limited individual campaign contributions to between $100 and
$300 per election.65 The court perceived the contribution limits
were more severe and less justified than the $1000 limit held con-
stitutional in Buckley. 66 The court then concluded that the limits
Multicandidate $5000 $15,000 $5000 no limit
committee* may
give:
Other political $1000 $20,000 $5000 no limit
committee may give:
* A multicandidate committee is a political committee with more than 50 contributors
that has been registered for at least 6 months and, with the exception of state party com-
mittees, has made contributions to 5 or more candidates for federal office. See 2 U.S.C.
§441a(a)(4) (1994).
** Exception: If a contributor gives to a committee knowing that a substantial portion of
the contribution will be used to support a particular. candidate, then the contribution
counts against the donor's limit for that candidate (first column on the chart).
This chart can be derived from 2 U.S.C. §441a(a) (1994), see also 11 C.F.R. 110.1-110.2
(1997).
59. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1976).
60. See id. at 25-27.
61. See id
62. "To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo
from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (describing the state interest of
preventing corruption).
63. Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 635-36 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Nixon v. Carver,
116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996).
64. Adopted by initiative under proposition A, per election per candidate campaign
contributions were limited to: $100 for elections in districts with fewer than 100,000 resi-
dents; $200 in districts of 100,000 or more residents; and $300 for statewide candidates
such as Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Auditor, Treasurer and Sec-
retary of State. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.100 (West 1994).
65. See Carver, at 641-43.
66. See id. at 644.
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violated contributors' constitutional rights of freedom of speech
and association.67 Thus, the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right
of individuals to make small campaign contributions.
In addition to regulating the size of contributions, campaign
finance laws in the United States also limit the source of contribu-
tions.68 The FECA does not allow corporations to contribute to
campaigns from corporate funds.69 Corporations are allowed to
establish PACs to raise voluntary contributions.70 Unfortunately,
the voluntariness of these contributions is debatable because cor-
porations can coerce contributions from their officers and employ-
ees.71
In Taiwan, the POERL not only allows corporate contribu-
tions,72 but also allows corporations to contribute more than indi-
viduals. The POERL limits contributions to the lesser of a set
limit or an income percentage. 73 Individual contributions are lim-
ited to N.T.$20,000 (U.S.$714) 74 per candidate and N.T.$200,000
(U.S.$7140) per party, and 20% of the individual's annual in-
come. 75 "Profit seeking enterprises" are limited to the lesser of
N.T.$300,000 (U.S.$10,714) per candidate and N.T.$3,000,000
(U.S.$107,143) per party, or 10% of their annual income.76 Thus,
corporations are allowed to contribute more than ten times an in-
dividual's allowable contribution.
Allowing corporate contributions is problematic because cor-
porations can make contributions in exchange for improper politi-
cal favors. Allowing large corporate contributions compounds the
risk of corruption. The POERL allows corporations seeking pub-
67. See id.
68. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1994) (regulating contributions from various classes of indi-
viduals and organizations).
69. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1994); see also United States v. Congress of Industrial
Org., 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948) (tracing the origin of the ban on corporate contributions to
the Act of Jan. 26, 1907, and stating that the legislation seemed to have been motivated
by preventing corporate influence in elections).
70. See generally CORPORATE PACS, supra note 10 (explaining the internal workings
of corporate PACs).
71. See id at 37-41 (providing anecdotal evidence of coercion).
72. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 45(3) (1994) (Taiwan)
(listing prohibited sources of campaign contributions such as public officials and foreign
entities).
73. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 45(5) (1994) (Taiwan).
74. The currency of Taiwan is the New Taiwan dollar (N.T.). Assume a currency
conversion of N.T.$28 to U.S.$1. See ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1997, at 108.
75. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 45(5) (1994) (Taiwan).
76. See id4
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lic contracts to contribute to the same public officials who will
later approve those contracts. 77 Mandatory reporting require-
ments can discourage candidates from accepting such contribu-
tions. Faced with the high costs of campaigning, however, candi-
dates may prefer to risk embarrassment in the media rather than a
large debt. Allowing large corporate contributions also gives
KMT candidates the advantage of contributions from KMT owned
enterprises.78 Some DPP candidates in the 1989 elections com-
plained that KMT candidates misused funds from KMT owned in-
dustries.79
Because of contribution loopholes, merely lowering the
amount of corporate contributions will be ineffective. The "soft
money" 80 loophole in the United States is one way individuals and
corporate PACs circumvent contribution limits. 81 In the United
States, the FECA strictly limits the amount of money individuals
and PACs can give to specific candidates, 82 yet the FECA does not
regulate contributions provided for party building efforts. 83
Contributions to state and local party organizations are sup-
posed to fund state and local volunteer activities such as voter
registration, get-out-the-vote drives and bumper stickers.84 In
practice, local party organizations often misuse funds by advocat-
ing specific candidates. 85 State and local party organizations can
circumvent contribution limits by spending soft money on behalf
of the national party.86 Thus, soft money can finance television
advertising for presidential candidates. 87 Although soft money can
77. See id art. 45(3) (prohibiting contributions by government enterprises and corpo-
rations who receive contributions from the government).
78. See infra note 182.
79. See Copper, Democratic Promise, supra note 5, at 70 (referring to vote buying in
the 1989 elections, the author states that "DPP candidates accused the KMT of using
funds from party-owned companies in illegal ways").
80. "[T]he principal loophole in the federal campaign spending law is something that
has come to be called 'soft money'. In the broadest sense, soft money encompasses any
contributions not regulated by federal election laws." MAKINSON & GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 6, at 20; see also 2 USC § 431(8)(B) (1994) (enumerating a list of donations not con-
sidered contributions for the purpose of campaign finance regulations).
81. See id.
82. See contributions limits chart, supra note 58.
83. See MAKINSON & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 20.
84. See id; see also 2 USC § 431(8)(B).
85. See MAKINSON & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 20.
86. See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 104 (explaining how the soft money loophole
was particularly troubling in the 1988 general election).
87. See MAKINSON & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 20.
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promote grass-roots political participation, some campaign finance
reform advocates called for a ban on soft money.88 A less drastic
alternative would be to regulate the use of "party money" to advo-
cate a particular candidate.
Taiwan does regulate contributions for general party building.
In 1994, the POERL limited individuals to the lesser of
N.T.$200,000 (U.S.$7140) per party or 20% of the person's annual
income.8 9 "Profit seeking enterprises" were limited to the lesser of
N.T.$3,000,000 (U.S.$107,143) per party or 10% of their annual in-
come.
Taiwan faces an even larger soft money loophole than that of
the United States. The POERL limits contributions from indi-
viduals and profit organizations to candidates and political parties,
but fails to regulate contributions from nonprofit organizations
such as PACs. Corporations and individuals reaching the maxi-
mum contribution limit can simply contribute through a PAC to
avoid contribution limits.90 The contribution limits in the POERL
fail to prevent the corrupting influence of large contributions and
corporate contributions.
The tax deductibility of campaign contributions in the
POERL also favors corporations over individuals. Campaign con-
tributions have been tax deductible since the 1989 elections, sub-
ject to certain limitations.91 Individuals can still deduct up to
N.T.$20,000 for contributions to candidates and up to 20% of their
gross income for contributions to political parties.92 Businesses
are still allowed to deduct campaign contributions as ordinary
business expenses. They can deduct up to N.T.$300,000 for contri-
butions to candidates 93 and up to 10% of their taxes for contribu-
88. "By far the most important campaign finance issue Congress must wrestle with is
how to close the 'soft money' loophole." Jonathan Cohn, Reform School (visited Jan. 17,
1998) <http://motherjones.com/coinop-congress/97mojo-400/reform.html> (advocating a
ban on soft money under the McCain-Feingold Bill); see also Richard Lacayo, The Gang's
All Here, TIME, Oct. 6, 1997, at 43 (predicting the failure of the McCain-Feingold Bill).
89. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 45(5) (1994) (Taiwan).
90. See id.
91. See id. (requiring for tax deductibility that (1) the candidate get at least 5% of the
popular vote, (2) the candidate be a public official higher than the provincial level, and
(3) any profit enterprises donating money did not operate at a loss for the past three
years).
92. See Campaign Contributions Are Tax Deductible, TAIWAN TRIBUNE, Oct. 8, 1997,
at 1 (source in Chinese).
93. See id
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tions to political parties.94 Encouraging large corporate contribu-
tions implies that businesses are expected to contribute to receive
preferential treatment or avoid unfavorable taxes. Favoring cor-
porate contributions over individual contributions may also dis-
courage small individual contributions.
The POERL also treats a campaign contribution as a personal
gift to a candidate. 95 The POERL condones the commingling of
personal and campaign funds by allowing a candidate a personal
tax deduction for campaign expenditures that exceed contribu-
tions.96 Allowing the commingling of campaign funds with per-
sonal funds risks corruption and adds to the appearance of corrup-
tion.
B. Expenditure Limits
Expenditure limits set a maximum dollar amount for candi-
date and political party campaign expenses. Expenditure limits
diminish the advantage of personal fortune and large campaign
funds. By spending less, candidates should be less indebted to
large campaign contributors. Expenditure ceilings, however, also
limit candidate speech since advertising expenses are a part of
campaign expenditures. 97 Even as early as Canada's 1979 general
election, the majority of campaign expenditures paid for television
and radio advertising.98 Thus, every election system's expenditure
94. See id
95. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 45(5) (1994) (Taiwan)
(calculating the candidate's personal tax deduction as campaign expenses minus campaign
contributions).
96. See id.
97. Sometimes advertising expenses comprise the majority of campaign expenses.
See advertising expense chart infra note 98.
98. "Table 10-1 Advertising Expenses, By Medium and Party, 1979"
Conservatives Liberal NDP Other Total
Print 10% 24% 24% 70% 18%
Radio 34% 23% 19% 14% 27%
Television 56% 53% 58% 16% 55%
Total spent on 2,745,501 2,434,405 1,333,080 63,704
Advertisements III
Percent of total 71% 62% 61% 65% 65%
Expenditures I II__f ]
Frederick J. Fletcher, Playing the Game: The Mass Media and the 1979 Campaign, in
CANADA AT THE POLLS, 1979 AND 1980: A STUDY OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS 280,
288-289 (Howard R. Penniman ed., 1981) (tabulating calculated data reported in Chief
Electoral Officer, Special Report to the Speaker of the House of Commons Respecting
Election Expenses of Registered Parties and Candidates for the Thirty-first General Elec-
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regulations necessarily balance the value of political speech against
the value of egalitarian elections.
The United States values unlimited political speech over
egalitarian elections. The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo,99
held that the FECA's campaign expenditure limits were unconsti-
tutional. 100 The Court reasoned that restricting expenditures nec-
essarily reduced the quantity of political speech because television
and radio ads were "indispensable instruments of effective politi-
cal speech."'101 After equating speech with political advertising
expenses, the Court required an important government interest to
justify the FECA's restriction on political expression. 102 The
Court then held that no government interest could justify the
FECA's campaign expenditure limits, 103 noting that the Act's con-
tribution limits and disclosure provisions already alleviated the po-
tential for corruption. 104
The Court also concluded that the government's interest in
promoting egalitarian elections did not justify the FECA's expen-
diture ceiling.105 The Court asserted that "the concept that gov-
ernment may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment, which was designed 'to secure the widest
tion, May 22, 1979 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1980)).
99. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
100. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §
101, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 608). Section 608 (c)(1)(A), (B) limited
nomination and election expenditures. Presidential candidates were limited to ten million
dollars for nomination and twenty million dollars for general election campaigning.
Section 608(c)(1)(C) and (D) limited senatorial campaign spending according to the vot-
ing-age population with a minimum dollar amount in States with small populations. Sen-
ate primaries were limited to the greater of eight cents multiplied by the voting-age
population or $100,000. Senate elections were limited to 12 cents multiplied by the vot-
ing-age population or $150,000. Section 608(c)(1)(C)-(E) limited campaigns for both
primaries and general elections in the House of Representatives to $70,000 each, how-
ever, a state with only one representative was allowed the senatorial ceiling. Section
608(d) adjusted these limits for inflation at the beginning of each calendar year by the av-
erage percentage rise in the consumer price index for the 12 preceding months.
101. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
102 See id. at 44.
103. See id at 45 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1974)); see also Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 608).
104. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
105. See id. at 48-49; see also Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (adding campaign expenditure limits in 18
U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1974)).
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possible dissemination of information.. .,106 Thus, the desire to
promote egalitarian elections through expenditure limits failed to
justify the abridgment of candidates' First Amendment rights.
10 7
Canada's use of spending limits demonstrates its preference
for egalitarian public participation over unlimited political speech.
Most Canadian jurisdictions impose spending limits during the
election period.10 8 The Canadian Supreme Court weighed the
value of egalitarian elections against the value of free speech. In
Regina v. Blake,10 9 the Canadian Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of advertising expenditure limits in the Elections
Finances Act of Manitoba.110 Unlike the United States, the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court refused to equate speech with advertising
expenditures, and held that limiting advertising expenses did not
restrict the speech of political candidates."' The Canadian Su-
preme Court also decided that promoting public confidence and
egalitarian political participation would justify the regulations
even if limiting advertising expenses restricted the speech of politi-
cal candidates.112
Canadian federal law continues to limit campaign expenses. 113
Unfortunately, political parties can circumvent expenditure limits
because expenditures are narrowly defined as only those that di-
rectly promote or oppose the election of a candidate during the
official election period. 114 Canadian law fails to recognize ex-
penses outside the official election period, such as money spent on
offices, staff and overhead. 115 When a political party provides of-
fices and staff to promote a candidate, only a small portion of
106. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
107. See id
108. See Zev Paltiel, supra note 54, at 67.
109. See Regina v. Blake [1988] 5 W.C.B.2d 23.
110. See id.
111. See id. (responding to the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley by stating "it is clear
that the purely 'libertarian' values which the U.S. Supreme Court held were enshrined in
the American Constitution are not the same values enshrined in our own Constitution").
112. See id. (stating that "even if § 51(2) were found to be an infringement of [the
freedom of expression under] § 2(b) it would constitute a reasonable limit on freedom of
speech").
113. See Election Expenses Act, R.S.C., ch. 51, § 13.2 (1974) (Can.) (limiting party ex-
penditures to Can$.30 per registered voter).
114. See Zev Paltiel, supra note 54, at 67.
115. See idL (explaining that Canadian law considers money spent outside the official
election period as ongoing expenses as opposed to election expenses).
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these expenses are considered a candidate's campaign expenses. 116
Taiwan's campaign finance law has included expenditure lim-
its since the drafting of the POERL in 1980.117 The POERL calcu-
lates the campaign expenditure limits for each pair of presidential
and vice presidential candidates by multiplying 70% of Taiwan's
total population with N.T.$15 and then adding N.T.$80 million. 118
This formula would have allowed N.T.$302.45 million (U.S.$10.8
million) 119 for the 1996 presidential and vice presidential elec-
tions.120 The POERL also limits campaign expenditures for non-
presidential public officials. 121 To determine expenditure limits in
the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, State Council, and mu-
nicipal city council, the POERL multiplies 70% of the total popu-
lation times N.T.$15 plus a fixed amount. 122 For provincial gover-
nor, municipal mayor, magistrate and city mayor elections, the
POERL sets the maximum expenditure at 70% of the total popu-
lation multiplied by N.T.$8 plus a fixed amount. 123 The fixed
amount varies according to the office and ranges from N.T.$10
million (U.S.$357,143) for a provincial governor' 24 to N.T.$80,000
(U.S.$2857) for an aboriginal tribal chief.125
Taiwan's expenditure limits are effective when properly en-
forced. Taiwan's expenditure ceilings might seem high, but Legis-
lative Yuan candidates often exceeded them, even in 1989 when
116. See id (noting that campaign overhead expenses can be paid by the party); see
also Election Expenses Act, R.S.C., ch. 51, § 13.2(1.1) (1974) (Can.) (excluding as expen-
ditures, money spent by the party for the candidate).
117. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 45(1) (1983) (Taiwan).
118. See Taiwan's Government Information Office (last visited Oct. 10, 1997)
<http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/election/eleclaw.html> (providing a summary of the
PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND RECALL LAW (1996)
(Taiwan)).
119. The currency of Taiwan is the New Taiwan dollar (N.T.). Assume a currency
conversion of N.T.$28 to U.S.$1. See ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1997, at 108.
120. This quick calculation was provided by Taiwan's Government Information Office,
supra note 118.
121. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW, ch. 3, art. 45(2) (1994)
(Taiwan).
122. See id
123. See id
124. Assuming a 21.3 million total population in Taiwan and a N.T.$28 to U.S.$1 con-
version, a candidate for the Provincial Governor would be allowed approximately U.S.$8
million to campaign.
125. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW, ch. 3, art. 45(2) (1994)
(Taiwan).
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inflation had not yet eroded the limits. 126 One Legislative Yuan
KMT candidate, Wu Li-yi stated publicly that "he would spend
N.T.$30 million (over one million U.S. dollars) on the election and
his DPP opponent would spend double that. '127
Taiwan should reconsider the role of expenditure limits in the
campaign finance regulations. When first drafted in 1980, the
POERL represented the current balance of free political speech
against egalitarian elections. After the lifting of martial law and
the democratization of the elections, the legislature should rebal-
ance free political speech against the campaign expenditure limits.
C. Advertising Regulations
Limits on advertising directly control the amount of speech
available to candidates, but can also provide a more level playing
field. Canada justifies political advertising regulations on the basis
of equitable apportionment of airwave resources. 128 Canada's
Election Expenses Act limits political advertisements to the last
twenty-eight days of the campaign period.129 Thus, wealthy candi-
dates cannot benefit from early advertising campaigns. Shorter
advertising campaigns, being more affordable, allow candidates a
more equal opportunity to advertise.
While Canada can claim to limit political speech for equitable
reasons, Taiwan's partisan media history shows that direct adver-
tising limits have had inequitable results. Traditionally, the KMT
government controlled all of Taiwan's news media.130 During the
elections, the news media could give the KMT generous and fa-
vorable news coverage while briefly mentioning opposition candi-
126. Some election observers of the 1989 elections noted that "[s]pending in excess of
legal limits was also commonplace." See Copper, Democratic Promise, supra note 5, at 70
(describing the 1989 Legislative Yuan elections).
127. Id Assuming a 1989 population of 2.5 million in Taipei and a N.T.$28 to U.S.$1
conversion, a candidate for the Legislative Yuan representing Taipei would be allowed
roughly N.T.$32,300,000 or U.S.$1,150,000 to campaign.
12& See BOYER, supra note 3, at 320-21 (listing the policies that "diminish absolute
freedom of speech.").
129. See Election Expense Act, R.S.C., ch. 51, §§ 13.7, 61.2 (1974) (Can.); see also
BOYER, supra note 3, at 329-31 (discussing the "blackout" limitation that only allows ad-
vertising by parties and candidates during the 28 day period).
130. See Copper, Democratic Promise, supra note 5, at 71 (mentioning the DPP's
complaints of the KMT's television monopoly during the 1989 Legislative Yuan elec-
tions); see also GIVE TAIWAN A CHANCE, supra note 29, at 51-52 (criticizing the KMT
for using their network television stations to exert social control over the Taiwanese
people).
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dates. The POERL also banned political advertisement on televi-
sion and radio, allowing candidates only government sponsored
television and radio news coverage. 131 When the POERL was first
enacted in 1980 it also prohibited political demonstrations. 132 By
1989, the POERL allowed street demonstrations, public speeches
and political rallies, but restricted when and where they could be
held.133 Thus, the POERL limited DPP candidates to print media
such as magazines, newspapers and direct mail.
In 1994, political advertisements on television and radio were
still banned. 134 When the KMT also refused to grant television
and radio station licenses to the DPP, the DPP sponsored the
creation of illegal cable television and pirate radio stations to cam-
paign for the 1992 elections.135 These illegal stations provided
election coverage, community news and political commentary. 136
In 1993, the Legislative Yuan legalized cable television and began
licensing spare frequencies. 137 With the proliferation of cable
television, Taiwan truly developed into a mass media society138
and candidates began appearing on talk shows. 139
When the Legislative Yuan reconsiders the television and ra-
dio advertising ban, they may agree with the U.S. Supreme Court
in Buckley, finding television and radio to be "indispensable in-
struments of effective political speech."'140 The Legislative Yuan
must then decide how to regulate network and cable advertising.
131. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 50(2) (1994) (Taiwan).
132. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 55 (1983) (Taiwan).
The law targeted non-KMT candidates since non-KMT candidates relied on street dem-
onstrations after being excluded from television and radio.
133. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 55 (1989) (Taiwan)
(limiting speeches and rallies to officially designated times and areas).
134. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 50(2) (1994) (Taiwan).
135. See Tien & Chu, supra note 40, at 1155 (1996) (explaining that the government
began to grant network television licenses and radio licenses in the summer of 1995 be-
cause they could no longer control all the pirate stations).
136. See id (describing the illegal radio stations as the "most effective campaign
weapons of the two opposition parties" for certain 1993 and 1994 elections).
137. See id. (noting that the Legislative Yuan revised the Broadcast and Television
Law on August 2, 1993, and enacted the Cable Television Law a week later).
138. See Thomas B. Gold, Taiwan Society at the Fin de Siecle, 148 THE CHINA Q. 1104,
1107 (1996) (describing "a youth-oriented pop music industry" and the rise of Asian
MTV).
139. See Copper, Democratic Promise, supra note 5, at 32-33 (attributing an increased
influence of cable television, talk shows and political debates to the success of the smaller
New Party in Taiwan's 1995 Legislative Yuan elections).
140. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
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D. Independent Expenditure Limits
Campaign finance regulations can also regulate independent
expenditures. Independent expenditures are "funds spent inde-
pendently by interest groups to either support or oppose candi-
dates. ' 141 Usually these expenditures pay for political advertising
through television, radio or direct mail. Expenditures are only
"independent" where they pay for political messages not prepared
in coordination with a candidate. 142
Limiting candidate and party spending while allowing unlim-
ited independent expenditures would encourage contributors to
incur expenses on behalf of candidates. Wealthy special interests
could outspend candidates and political parties.
The Canadian legislature feared manipulation of the electoral
system by wealthy special interests.143 In 1974, this concern
prompted them to prohibit independent expenditures in the Elec-
tion Expenses Act.144 Since the Canada Election Act required the
publisher's name and address on election literature, 145 only regis-
tered political parties and candidates could authorize election lit-
erature. Opponents of the independent expenditures ban claimed
that these laws effectively prohibited all speech unauthorized by
registered political parties and candidates. 146
The Canadian Supreme Court held the prohibition on inde-
pendent expenditures unconstitutional in National Citizens' Coali-
tion Inc. v. Attorney General Canada.147 Under section one of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 148 the Court weighed
141. MAKINSON & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 19 (noting that in the elections for the
United States Senate and House of Representatives, independent expenditures amounted
to $5.2 million in 1993-1994, "a sharp decline from the $11.1 million spent two years ear-
lier.").
142. In 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994) an independent expenditure is defined as:
[A]n expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation
with any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and
which is not made in concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candi-
date, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate.
2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1994); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.16 (1997).
143. See National Citizens' Coalition Inc. v. Attorney Gen. Canada [1984] 14 C.R.R.
61 (Alta. Q.B.).
144. See Election Expenses Act, R.S.C., ch. 51, § 12 (1974) (Can.) (amending Canada
Elections Act, R.S.C., ch. 14 (1st Supp.), § 70.1(1) (1970) (Can.)).
145. See Canada Elections Act, R.S.C., ch. 14 (1st. Supp.), § 72 (1970) (Can.).
146. See Zev Paltiel, supra note 54, at 60.
147. National Citizens' Coalition Inc., 14 C.R.R. at 61.
148. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) was an amendment to
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equality in federal elections against the individual's freedom of
expression 149 through special interests. The Court concluded that
free speech outweighed the risk of election manipulation. 150
This holding unintentionally created a loophole in Canada's
expenditure regulations.151 Since advertising expenses comprised
the majority of independent expenditures, 152 contributors could
spend unlimited amounts of money promoting a candidate instead
of directly contributing to the candidate's campaign. 153 In addi-
tion, candidates could avoid exceeding expenditure limits by allow-
ing wealthy special interests to pay for advertising expenses.
The U.S. Congress also tried to eliminate independent ex-
penditures, 154 but the U.S. Supreme Court held that such limita-
tions unconstitutionally restricted political speech.155 In Buckley,
the Court reasoned that no stated state interest could justify limit-
ing independent expenditures because advertising money was of
limited utility if the contributor did not coordinate with the candi-
the Canadian Constitution enacted by the Canada Act of 1982 (U.K.). CAN. CONST.
(Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). The Charter
expressly provides for judicial review and enumerates a long list of individual rights. See
OONAGH E. FITZGERALD, UNDERSTANDING CHARTER REMEDIES: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE 1.3 (Carswell 1994) (boasting that the Charter is more legitimate and contains a
more constitutional basis for judicial review than the United States Constitution). Section
one reads "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and free-
doms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by the law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." See The Canadian Charter of
Rights, Annotated Vol. 1, CA-1 (Canadian Law Book Inc. 1997).
149. See The Canadian Charter of Rights, Annotated Vol. 1, CA-1 (Canadian Law
Book Inc.) (1997) (stating the freedom of expression guaranteed by section 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
150. See id. at § 2(b): 140010 (summarizing the holding and rationale in National Citi-
zen's Coalition Inc. v. Attorney General for Canada (1984), 11 D.L.R.4th 481.); see also
Zev Paltiel, supra note 54, at 59-62 (discussing policies the Court considered in concluding
that sections 70.1(1) and 72 of the Canada Elections Act violated the freedom of speech
guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
151. See Zev Paltiel, supra note 54,.at 63 (arguing that parliament must close the loop-
hole, "[o]therwise, the way is now clear for unlimited 'third party' spending which will
make a mockery of the act, to the benefit of the affluent. Advocacy groups, single-issue
organizations and interest groups will be able to go beyond promoting the issue they favor
to direct involvement in election campaigns...").
152. For a table of advertising expenses for the Canadian 1979 campaigns, see supra
note 98.
153. See Regina v. Blake [1988] 5 W.C.B.2d 23, 23 (stating that groups not directly af-
filiated with a candidate or registered political party could spend unlimited amounts).
154. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1974); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-51
(1976).
155. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-51.
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date. 156 Also, the lack of a prior agreement would limit the pos-
sibility of exchanging of advertisements for political favors.
157
Thus, the United States allows unlimited independent expendi-
tures.
To prevent independent expenditures from circumventing
contribution limits, U.S. campaign finance laws treat money spent
expressly advocating a candidate as a contribution to that candi-
date. 158 Thus, contribution limits prevent unlimited independent
expenditures.
Early elections in Taiwan allowed little political participation
by noncandidates. To prevent disorder and interference by non-
candidates the POERL banned all independent speech by allowing
only candidates, their registered assistants and political parties to
participate in "campaign activities."'1 59 "Campaign activities" in-
cluded public speeches, printing or distributing campaign materi-
als, public demonstrations, and mass-media broadcasting or ad-
vertising. 160 Strict regulations in the POERL went as far as
requiring handbills be signed by the registered candidate. 161
By 1994, Taiwan's Legislative Yuan liberalized political
speech and eventually lifted the ban on independent speech.162
Unfettered political speech should foster democracy, however,
wealthy special interests are now allowed to spend unlimited
amounts of money to influence elections. One could argue that
political advertising by special interests would strengthen a democ-
racy. Unfortunately, contributors reaching their contribution limit
can circumvent the limits by substituting independent political ad-
vertising for donations.
156. See id
157. See id.
158. "[Eixpenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or in concert,
with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees,
or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate." 2 U.S.C. §
441(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994).
159. PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 56 (1983) (Taiwan).
160. Id.
161. See id art. 51. Compare Copper & Chen, supra note 33, at 64 (referring to a
provision in the original POERL that, like the Canadian provision, required handbills
bear the printer's name and address), with Canada Elections Act, R.S.C., ch. 14 (1st.
Supp.), § 72 (1970) (Can.) (requiring election literature bear the publisher's name and
address).
162. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 56 (1994) (Taiwan)
(noting that the provisions of article 56 have been deleted).
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E. Public Subsidies for Candidates and Parties
Public subsidization of election campaigns can mitigate high
campaign costs and reduce the risk of corruption. Public subsidies
can also serve egalitarian goals by assisting under-funded candi-
dates. On the other hand, public subsidies can create their own
problems.
In the United States, only presidential campaigns are publicly
funded. 163 The Presidential Campaign Fund receives revenue
from a provision on the individual income tax return form. 164 The
provision allows each taxpayer to designate a certain amount of
money to subsidize the presidential campaigns. 165 Even though
taxpayers are told that contributing to the fund will not change
their personal tax liability or refund, participation has never ex-
ceeded 30%.166
The Presidential Campaign Fund disburses the funds raised in
the voluntary tax checkoff to candidates who agree to limit their
expenses. 167 Unfortunately, these expenses do not include spend-
ing soft money. 168 Thus, public financing in the United States
merely gives qualified candidates equal shares of the revenues
from the tax checkoff.169 This scheme assists small parties that are
able to raise the requisite number of contributions. Because can-
didates need only collect a large number of contributions to qual-
ify for public funds,170 the public cannot individually choose a re-
cipient candidate or the amount of the public subsidy.171
Candidates receiving a fixed subsidy for each vote received
would be funded in proportion to their popularity. Taiwan's pub-
163. See ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 99 (explaining the structure of public financing
in the United States).
164. See id at 100-03 (explaining how the tax checkoff funds the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund).
165. See id.
166. See id at 101 (claiming a record participation percentage of 28.7% in 1981).
167. See I.R.C. § 9003 (1997) (requiring candidates to limit their expenses and only
accept contributions to cover their total campaign expenditures).
168. See MAKINSON & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 20 (discussing the nature and
prevalence of soft money).
169. See I.R.C. § 9004(a)(1) (1997) (providing "equal payments" for eligible candi-
dates of major parties).
170. See id (providing the eligibility requirements for candidates).
171. See Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public
Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 47 (1996) (arguing
that the U.S. system inadequately reflects voter preferences).
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lic funding scheme reimburses172 candidates for public offices.
173
After a 1989 revision to the POERL,174 the election commission
reimbursed candidates and political parties a certain amount of
money for every vote received. Under the 1989 revision, candi-
dates were reimbursed N.T.$10 (U.S.$0.39) for every vote in ex-
cess of seventy 5% of the votes needed for victory.
175
In 1996, the Legislative Yuan amended the POERL to reim-
burse political parties. 176 The POERL later increased the amount
of the reimbursements. The government also subsidized party ex-
penditures by N.T.$5 for each vote their candidates received over
5% of the total votes cast in the election. 177 The 1994 POERL
also reimbursed candidates N.T.$30 for each vote exceeding one
third of the votes sufficient to win in a one seat election or half the
votes it would take to win in an election for two or more seats.
7 8
Because candidates and political parties are funded in pro-
portion to their popularity, this system favors candidates from
large and organized political parties. Small political parties that
receive less than 5% of the popular vote may never receive fund-
ing.179 Also, recently registered political parties and candidates in
their first election do not receive money until after the election.
This deters new political parties because their better funded com-
petitors are also armed with reimbursements from prior elections.
When the KMT controlled Legislative Yuan promulgated the
public finance provisions in the POERL for the 1989 elections,
they intended public subsidies to prefer large political parties. The
KMT continues to promote a two party system.180 On the other
172. The meaning of reimburse suffers ambiguity when translated from English to
Chinese. See Anne S.Y. Cheung, Towards a Bilingual Legal System-The Development of
Chinese Legal Language, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 315, 331 (1997) (describing
problems arising from translating English legal language into Chinese legal language).
Fortunately, official English versions of statutes drafted in Chinese lack ambiguities aris-
ing from translation.
173. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 45(6) (1994) (Taiwan).
174. See PUBLIC OFFICIALs ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 45(5) (1989) (Taiwan);
see also Copper, Democratic Promise supra note 5, at 3, 19 (mentioning a public financing
provision in the revised law).
175. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 45(5) (1989) (Taiwan).
176. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 45(6) (1994) (Taiwan).
177. See id.
178. See id
179. See id. (requiring a 5% threshold before qualifying for reimbursements).
180. See Tien & Chu, supra note 40, at 1160 (explaining the KMT party leadership's
desire to change the electoral system to promote a two-party system at the expense of the
New Party).
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hand, this preference for candidates from large and organized po-
litical parties would not deter personally wealthy mavericks from
funding their own campaigns as independents.
Public finance can also benefit the KMT. Historically, the
KMT relied on their party-owned corporations to finance their
candidates' campaigns. In 1991, KMT party-owned enterprises
were earning more than N.T.$4 billion a year (U.S.$161 million)
181
in dividends allowed the KMT to maintain three thousand full
time staff. 182 Thus, the KMT has not required a broad base of con-
tributors or even a few large contributors. 183 Accepting public
subsidies would allow KMT candidates to be less indebted to their
party-owned corporations. This would legitimize the KMT party
by eliminating the appearance of corruption.
While the public subsidy scheme provides many benefits, it is
also flawed. The public subsidy scheme appears corrupt because
candidates receive the subsidies as personal income. Although the
KMT controlled the drafting of the public subsidy provisions, it
was the DPP who advocated for public subsidies. DPP candidates
have been criticized for accepting reimbursements. Because pub-
lic subsidies can be expensive, maintaining a public subsidy scheme
requires popular support. To maintain the viability of public sub-
sidies, Taiwan's Legislative Yuan should revise the POERL to
eliminate the appearance and possibility of corruption.
F. Government Provided Media Time
In addition to providing funds for political parties and candi-
dates, public subsidies can also provide free television or radio
time. Because advertising can consume a large portion of a candi-
date's campaign expenditures, 184 free television or radio time can
greatly alleviate campaign costs. Like public subsidies, govern-
ment provided media time can reduce the risk of corruption and
assist under-funded candidates.
Canada has embraced government provided television and
181. Assuming a 1991 exchange rate of N.T.$28 to U.S.$1.
182. "[T]he party has either direct or indirect investment in more than 66 companies
including nine listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange and 27 public companies. The book
value of the party's stake in these 36 public companies alone was worth more than
N.T.$59.5 billion (U.S.$2.4 billion) by the end of 1991." Tien & Chu, supra note 40, at
1156.
183. See id
184. Even as early as 1979, the majority of campaign expenses paid for advertising on
television and radio. See Table Advertising Expenses, supra note 98.
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radio time by requiring every broadcaster provide 6.5 prime time
hours "for transmission of political announcements and programs
produced by or on behalf of the registered parties." 185  The 6.5
hours are apportioned according to a party's representation in the
legislature or by their number of candidates.
186
Taiwan's public finance system is similar to the Canadian sys-
tem.187 Taiwan's Central Election Commission buys television
time and allocates it to the candidates. 188 Taiwan has also main-
tained a tradition of televising a live campaign forum,189 though
some candidates prefer not participate in televised presidential
debates. 190
The role of the official campaign forum has diminished since
it was first sponsored. When the POERL was first drafted, Taiwan
only had three KMT controlled broadcast television stations. The
government's tight control over the news media forced candidates
to rely on the government sponsored programs. Today, cable
television provides many channels capable of providing unofficial
political news and commentary.191 The DPP's broadcast and cable
television stations have diminished the informational role of the
government sponsored programs. Because the Election Commis-
sion buys television time instead of appropriating it from the sta-
tions, Taiwan's Legislative Yuan should consider whether gov-
ernment subsidized television time is worth its cost.
The POERL also requires the Election Commission to pro-
185. Election Expenses Act, R.S.C., § 99.1(1) (1974) (Can.); see also Election Ex-
penses Act, R.S.C., § 99.1(16) (1974) (Can.) (penalizing broadcasters up to $25,000 for
noncompliance).
186. See BOYER, supra note 3, at 456.
187. "Starting from the 1991 National Assembly election, the Central Election Com-
mission has purchased television time from three networks and allocated it amoung
qualified parties in proportion to the number of nominees." Tien & Chu, supra note 40,
at 1155.
188. See id.
189. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECrION AND RECALL LAW art. 50(2) (1994) (Taiwan)
(requiring the Central Election Commission to provide a minimum of two television pres-
entations of at least one hour each where candidates present their views and debate is-
sues); see also Tien & Chu, supra note 40, at 1155 (stating that "each candidate is entitled
to a 15-minute presentation.").
190. See Presidential Press Conference with Lee Teng-hui, President of Taiwan, at
Chiehshou Hall, Office of the President (Feb. 23, 1996) reprinted in
<http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/news/preside.html> (providing Lee Teng-hui's explanation
that a televised debate would be poor campaign strategy).
191. See Hsieh, supra note 12, at 7 (discussing foreign investment opportunities in the
growing cable industry).
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vide an election bulletin detailing each candidate. 192 Because
publicizing a candidate by direct mail can be expensive, inade-
quately funded candidates may not be able to afford even limited
mailings. Widely circulated election bulletins ensure that voters
have at least minimal familiarity with all candidates before elec-
tion day. Unfortunately, election bulletins are also expensive.
Canada experimented with similar election bulletins for a short
while, but then eliminated them because of their cost. Taiwan's
Legislative Yuan should also consider whether the Election
Commission should continue to prepare election bulletins.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVISIONS TO THE POERL
Taiwan's Legislative Yuan should revise the campaign contri-
bution and expenditure limits in the POERL to prevent corruption
and the appearance of corruption. The revised POERL can also
promote political equality between large and political small par-
ties.
A. Recommendations on Contribution Limits
Contribution limits in Taiwan have followed developments in
the United States by limiting large contributions to prevent cor-
ruption and the appearance of corruption. Taiwan's Legislative
Yuan would probably find inadequate the Canadian scheme of
relying solely on disclosure. The POERL should prohibit direct
corporate contributions and regulate contributions from nonprofit
organizations. Allowing large corporate contributions would allow
corporations to buy political favors.
The POERL prohibits contributions from government enter-
prises and corporations who receive "contributions" from the gov-
ernment.193 The term "contributions" seems ambiguous and may
not include granting pork projects. 194 Thus, the POERL should
also expressly prohibit government contractors from contributing
to candidates.
192. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 50(1) (1994) (Taiwan)
(requiring that an election bulletin be either mailed, printed in a newspaper or presented
on television).
193. See id
194. Compare id (Taiwan) (prohibiting persons who "receive contributions" from
contributing), with 18 U.S.C. § 603(a) (1994) (prohibiting contributions by federal em-
ployees). Analogizing these laws would equate receiving government "contributions"
with receiving government funding or support.
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In the United States, the FECA prohibited contributions from
government contractors. 195 The current U.S. campaign finance
laws define government contractors narrowly.196 The definition
would include closely held corporations, but would exclude their
majority shareholders. The Taiwanese Legislative Yuan should
construe the term "government contractors" broadly to include
business entities and majority owners of business entities that have
negotiated or are negotiating a contract with the government. A
broad prohibition of contributions from government contractors
would prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption.
The Taiwanese Legislative Yuan should further revise the
POERL to regulate nonprofit organizations. The United States
allows influential PACs, but limits abuse by expressly preventing
conduit contributions, 197 and by requiring PACs to be run inde-
pendent of party fundraising committees. To prevent contribu-
tions through straw donors posing as independent nonprofit or-
ganizations, the POERL should require nonprofit organizations to
be independent from candidates and political parties.
B. Recommendations on Expenditure Limits
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Taiwanese Legislative
Yuan should continue to set expenditure limits to promote egali-
tarian democratic goals. When deciding the scope of expenditure
limits, the Legislative Yuan should examine Canadian expenditure
limits. Because Canada's narrow definition of campaign expendi-
tures allowed candidates to circumvent the limits, Taiwan's Legis-
lative Yuan should adopt a broad definition of campaign expendi-
tures.
A broad definition of campaign expenditures should include
the party overhead that often benefits candidates. In Taiwan,
party overhead can be large since most political parties have or are
establishing party newspapers, television stations and radio sta-
tions. The Legislative Yuan should revise the POERL to consider
certain party overhead as campaign expenditures.
Party presses should be considered campaign expenses. Tai-
wan's media has had a very partisan history. By 1997, the KMT
195. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225 (1972)
(prohibiting contributions by government contractors).
196. See 2 U.S.C. § 441c (1997) (providing the current prohibition on contributions by
government contractors).
197. See 2 U.S.C. § 441f (1997) (prohibiting straw donors).
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still maintained control of most newspapers, radio stations and
television stations.198 Because the KMT controls the three major
network stations, the KMT can enjoy favorable coverage while
limiting the media access of others.
In response, the DPP created their own television stations,
radio stations, newspapers and internet websites. 199 Party run
television and radio stations may not be run exclusively to pro-
mote a political ideology. It may be difficult to distinguish be-
tween candidate campaign advertisements and favorable news
coverage. Thus, the POERL should define campaign expenses to
include the cost of running a television station to promote candi-
dates.
C. Recommendations on Advertising Regulations
Taiwan's Legislative Yuan should revise the POERL to end
the ban on television and radio advertisements. Because the
POERL was drafted before cable television, the ban on television
advertisements may only be thought to apply to Taiwan's major
network television stations. Although advertisements on cable
television may be legal, ending the blanket ban on television and
radio advertisements would legitimize political speech by remov-
ing any uncertainty. Allowing DPP candidates to buy time on
major network television stations would also allow them to forego
establishing party run stations. Eliminating such unnecessary du-
plication would lower campaign costs and be more economically
efficient.
Although television and radio advertising should not be
banned, other policy considerations may justify advertising regu-
lations. For example, Canada allows political advertising, but also
intends to control election expenses, equitably apportion airwave
resources and prevent incumbents from advertising with treasury
funds.200 Thus, Canada's Election Expenses Act limits political
advertisements to the last twenty-eight days of the campaign pe-
riod, with special provisions for radio and television. 201 Advertis-
198. See Tien & Chu, supra note 40, at 1155 (1996) (noting that though the KMT still
controls the three television stations, the KMT has allowed cable television).
199. The DPP homepage can be found at <http://www.dpp.org/>.
200. See BOYER, supra note 3, at 320-21 (listing the policies that "diminish absolute
freedom of speech.").
201. See Election Expenses Act, §§ 13.7, 61.2 (1974) (Can.); see also BOYER, supra
note 3, at 329-31 (discussing the "blackout" limitation that allows advertising by parties
and candidates only during the 28-day period).
5631998]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
ing expenses are also campaign expenditures and thus limited ac-
cordingly.
To control costs and equitably apportion airwave resources,
Taiwan can also adopt the Canadian model of limiting political ad-
vertisements to an official election period. During Taiwan's
twenty-eight day election period, campaign expenditures should
include the cost of party controlled television and radio stations
used to advocate particular candidates. This regulation would
level the playing field by limiting the KMT's advantage of party
controlled television stations. This regulation would also limit
election costs, and keep candidates and their political parties out
of debt.
D. Recommendations on Independent Expenditure Limits
Because Canada's ban on independent speech was unconsti-
tutional, candidate speech was limited to the benefit of independ-
ent speech. Thus, the Canadian legislature failed to equalize the
spending ability and influence of wealthy special interests. Al-
though egalitarian spending is a debatable policy goal, unlimited
independent speech did create a loophole in Canada's contribution
limits. Independent political advertising can now replace contri-
butions. The U.S. legislature, also foiled by the judiciary, limited
independent speech by treating political advertising as contribu-
tions where contributors coordinate with a candidate regarding the
advertising.202
In Taiwan, unlimited independent speech has fostered politi-
cal discourse and democracy, but independent speech should be
limited to prevent circumvention of contribution limits. Taiwan's
Legislative Yuan should revise the POERL to implement the U.S.
approach. Political advertising advocating a candidate should be
considered a campaign contribution to that candidate.
In addition to limiting political advertising under the contri-
bution limits, further restrictions on independent speech could be
justified if the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan decided to implement
egalitarian policies. In Taiwan, political advertising has often
come from special interests such as party presses and affiliated
news media.203 Although party presses are independent from
202. Rebroadcasting or reprinting a candidate's advertisement is considered suffi-
ciently cooperative to amount to an expenditure. See 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(7)(B)(ii) (1994).
203. Political activists have long operated newspapers to promote their political views.
See Ya-li, supra note 32, at 41 (describing organization of opposition to the KMT in the
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candidates, they do coordinate with candidates to provide free ad-
vertising. The DPP has complained that KMT controlled televi-
sion and radio stations give the KMT an unfair advantage in elec-
tions. Incorporating the cost of political advertising by party
presses into the definition of campaign expenditures would pro-
vide candidates equal access to mass media. DPP newspapers and
KMT television stations would be allowed equal funding.
E. Recommendations on Public Assistance
Taiwan should continue public funding to decrease the role of
big money contributors. Further revisions in the public funding
laws would decrease corruption and increase public participation.
Unfortunately, the current system appears susceptible to corrup-
tion and manipulation because DPP candidates are the largest
beneficiaries as well as the same group who advocated for the in-
clusion of a public subsidies provision in the POERL. Thus, Tai-
wan's Legislative Yuan should revise the POERL to give more
subsidies to political parties and less money to candidates. If po-
litical parties received the bulk of the subsidies, the public subsidy
system would appear less corrupt.
To further decrease corruption and the appearance of corrup-
tion, the POERL should expressly prohibit personal use of politi-
cal contributions and public subsidies. Prohibiting personal use of
campaign funds and public subsidies requires a great deal of will-
power and discipline. In the United States, some politicians were
able to exercise some self control.20 4 Other politicians had less self
control.205 In 1980, the U.S. Congress decided that the law had to
change. Thus, they amended the law to expressly prohibit any
'new' members of Congress from using campaign funds for per-
sonal use. 20 6
early 1970s which included a party press (Formosan Magazine) even before political par-
ties were allowed); see also Tin-yu, supra note 32, at 82 (describing political activist Lei
Chen, chief editor of Free China Magazine).
204. "For instance, Representative C.W. Bill Young, Republican of Florida, bought a
light blue $30,000 Lincoln Continental with campaign funds." CORPORATE PACS, supra
note 10, at 78. Although a Lincoln Continental could be considered a luxury car, candi-
dates do need transportation.
205. "When Joe Minish (D-N.J.) was defeated for reelection in 1984, he pocketed
$200,000 in campaign cash." lI& at 79.
206. To prevent possible confusion that Congress did not specifically exempt current
members, the amendment expressly exempted Members of Congress serving on January
8, 1980. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. 96-187, 93
Stat. 1354 (1980) (amending 2 U.S.C. § 439a to expressly prohibit personal use of cam-
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By 1993, Congress was mostly comprised of new members
who were prohibited from using campaign funds for personal use.
These "new" members with nothing to lose, eliminated the grand-
father clause.20 7 Since then, candidates could only use excess
campaign contributions by (1) defraying their expenses in connec-
tion with official duties, (2) contributing them to charity, or (3)
transferring them to a political party committee.
208
Taiwan's Legislative Yuan should follow the U.S. approach.
Because of political realities, Taiwan's Legislative Yuan may not
want to immediately limit their own personal benefits. They can,
however, prohibit the personal use of campaign funds by new legis-
lative members. The new legislative members could later elimi-
nate all personal use of campaign funds.
F. Recomendations for Government Sponsored Media Time,
Official Campaign Forum, and Official Election Bulletin
Taiwan should revise the POERL to continue the current
policy of providing media time to candidates. 209 Government
provided media time poses less risk of corruption than cash reim-
bursements because media time would be difficult to pocket for a
candidate's personal gain.
The Central Election Commission should not rely solely on
candidate produced advertisements to inform the voters. In Can-
ada, government provided television time was not enough for
some candidates:
The parties were far from content to rely on free time and news
coverage to reach uncommitted voters. Television and radio
were the preferred advertising media, most spots running only
thirty seconds on television and sixty on radio. Not surpris-
ingly, they tended to be aimed more at image making than in-
forming .... 210
paign funds for new members of congress).
207. See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-194, Title V, § 504, 103 Stat. 1755
(Nov. 30, 1989) (eliminating the grandfather clause to ban all Members of Congress from
using campaign funds for "any personal purpose").
208 See 2 U.S.C. § 439a (1994).
209. "Starting from the 1991 National Assembly election, the Central Election Com-
mission has purchased television time from three networks and allocated it amoung
qualified parties in proportion to the number of nominees." Tien & Chu, supra note 40,
at 1155.
210. Fletcher, supra note 98, at 280, 288-89.
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Thus, Taiwan's Central Election Commission should also be
allowed to expand the role of the official campaign forum. Under
the current law, two presentations of one hour each would only
allow a one hour forum with one rebroadcast. 211 This leaves can-
didates with only fifteen minutes each. To increase the depth of
discussion, the Legislative Yuan should require revise the POERL
to allow candidates more time.
The official campaign forum would also allow candidates from
smaller political parties an equal chance to interact with candi-
dates from major political parties. Voters may not otherwise hear
the views of candidates from smaller political parties. Although a
small percentage of voters would actually vote for candidates from
minority political parties, the presentation of minority views can
inform and educate voters. By the same rationale, official election
bulletins should also continue because they allow expression of
minority political parties' views. This would not allow an excessive
number of candidates, because certain provisions in the POERL
effectively limit the total number of candidates.
212
VI. CONCLUSION
With the establishment of a new democracy, the next step in
Taiwan's political evolution is to improve its campaign finance
laws. These new laws should try to prevent the quid pro quo sale
of political favors. Taiwan's Legislative Yuan could also use the
new laws to promote egalitarian political participation. In debat-
ing possible revisions to the POERL, Taiwan's Legislative Yuan
should examine the historical development of campaign finance
laws in the United States and Canada.
History suggests that contribution limits on nonprofit organi-
zations are necessary because interest groups or PACs may de-
velop to exploit the loopholes in the current contribution limits. A
potential loophole the expenditure limits can be averted by defin-
ing expenditures broadly. Lifting the absolute ban on independent
speech allowed greater political participation in Taiwan, it also al-
lowed individuals to incur advertising expenditures on behalf of
211. See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 50(2) (1994) (Taiwan)
(requiring the Central Election Commission to provide a minimum of two television pres-
entations of at least one hour each where candidates present their views and debate is-
sues).
212- See PUBLIC OFFICIALS ELECTION AND RECALL LAW art. 38 (1994) (Taiwan)
(requiring a security deposit for candidate registration).
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candidates. To eliminate this potential loophole, such expendi-
tures should be regulated as contributions to the candidate. The
POERL should allow Taiwan's Central Election Commission to
continue the tradition of official campaign forums and official
election bulletins. The POERL should also subsidize candidates
by providing public sponsored media time instead of reimburse-
ments. The combination of these revisions would allow greater
political participation by voters while preventing corruption in
elections.
Although revisions in campaign finance laws seem small com-
pared to proposed constitutional restructuring, campaign finance
reform is still necessary. Campaign finance laws can never clean
up politics, but revisions in the POERL can instill greater legiti-
macy and voter confidence in Taiwan's fledgling democracy.
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